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“It was not a case of saving the
mother ‘or’ the child. It was not a
matter of choosing one life ‘or’ the
other.”

rescind the hospital’s Catholic status, he asked
the hospital and Catholic Healthcare West,
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of a pathology in its maternal environment,”
Lysaught wrote. She added, “There was no
longer any chance that the life of this child

Moral Analysis
of Procedure at
Phoenix Hospital
M. Therese Lysaught

could be saved.” Lysaught looked at the clinical
history of the case, provided theoretical background for her conclusions and commented on statements by the National Catholic
Bioethics Center and the U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops’ Committee on Doctrine. The
moral analysis follows.
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Father John Ehrich, the
medical ethics director for
the Diocese of Phoenix, wrote
the following statement in
May 2010:
“A recent news story has
brought to our attention
the potential dangers that
still exist during pregnancy
for both mother and child.
We naturally ask, what is
the right thing to do if a
pregnant woman’s life is in
danger? Is it ever legitimate
to perform an abortion to
save the mother’s life? As
Catholics, we have clear
teaching in this area that
helps us to act in accord with
God’s will and in recognition
of the human dignity of every
person.

“Some Basic Principles
“It is important to note at
the outset that these are
very complex issues which
demand careful reﬂection. We
ﬁrst need to start with some
basic moral principles.
“First, no one can do evil that
good may come. We commonly know this as ‘the end
does not justify the means.’
Just because we can do something does not mean that we
should.
“Second, when speaking of a
woman who is pregnant, we
are always referring to two
people: mother and child.
Therefore, any medical intervention must seek the good
of both mother and child. In
short, we are dealing with
two patients, not just one.
So, we never would speak of
how the mother’s life is at
risk without reference to her
unborn child. Her child has
as much dignity and value
as she does. Morally speaking
we can never prefer one life
over the other.
“Third, the unborn child
can never be thought of as
a pathology or an illness.
That is, the child is not that
which threatens the life of
the mother, rather it is the
pathology or illness (cancer, premature rupture of
membranes, hypertension,
pre-eclampsia, etc.) which
threatens the mother’s life.
While it is often possible that

woman trying to carry to term, and because of
the severity of her disease, her own prospects
were closer to 50-50. Importantly, the woman,
a Catholic with four children, decided not to
terminate.
On Nov. 3, 2009, the woman was admitted to St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center
with worsening symptoms. At this time, the
woman was 11 weeks pregnant. A cardiac catheterization revealed that the woman now had
“very severe pulmonary arterial hypertension
with profoundly reduced cardiac output”; in
another part of the record, a different physician conﬁrmed “severe, life-threatening pulmonary hypertension,” “right heart failure”
and “cardiogenic shock.” The chart noted that
she had been informed that her risk of mortality “approaches 100 percent,” is “near 100
percent” and is “close to 100 percent” if she
were to continue the pregnancy. The chart also
noted that “surgery is absolutely contraindicated.”

“The chart noted that she had been
informed that her risk of mortality
‘approaches 100 percent,’ is ‘near
100 percent’ and is ‘close to 100
percent’ if she were to continue the
pregnancy. The chart also noted
that ‘surgery is absolutely contraindicated.’”
Pulmonary hypertension is a type of high
blood pressure that affects only the arteries
in the lungs and the right side of the heart. It
begins when the arteries and capillaries in the
lung become narrowed, blocked or destroyed,
making it harder for blood to ﬂow through the
lungs, raising the pressure in those arteries.
One consequence of this restricted ﬂow is
that the heart’s lower right chamber (the right
ventricle) has to work harder to pump blood
into the lungs, which eventually causes the

heart muscle to weaken and fail. Pulmonary
hypertension is a serious illness that becomes
progressively worse; it is not curable but it can
be treated, easing the symptoms; it is sometimes fatal.1
The normal physiologic changes accompanying pregnancy — increased blood volume
(40 percent), increased cardiac output (30-50
percent by 25 weeks) and slightly decreased
systemic blood pressure (10-20 percent by 28
weeks) — exacerbate pulmonary hypertension, leading to the increased risk of mortality
for the mother.2
In the current case, the patient’s attempt
to continue the pregnancy in order to nurture
the child’s life led to two negative physiological
outcomes: the failure of the right side of the
patient’s heart and cardiogenic shock.
Failure of the right side of the patient’s heart
means that the heart can no longer pump
blood into the lungs so that the blood can be
oxygenated. Without oxygenated blood, the
body’s organs and tissues quickly begin to die.
Cardiogenic shock is “a state in which the heart
has been damaged so much that it is unable
to supply enough blood to the organs of the
body.”3
In cardiogenic shock, cardiac output
decreases and one begins to see evidence of
tissue hypoxia — lack of oxygenation of the
patient’s tissues and major organs. Clinical
criteria for cardiogenic shock are “sustained
hypotension (systolic blood pressure <90 mm
Hg for at least 30 min) and a reduced cardiac
index (<2.2 L/min/m2) in the presence of elevated pulmonary capillary occlusion pressure
(>15 mm Hg).” In addition, visible signs of cardiogenic shock can be observed at the bedside,
including “hypotension and clinical signs of
poor tissue oxygenation, which include oliguria [low urine output], cyanosis [blue coloration of the skin], cool extremities and altered
mentation.”4
There is no cure for pulmonary hypertension. In this case, however, two additional
pathologies emerged — the pathology of right
side heart failure and cardiogenic shock. These
pathologies were immediately caused by the
physiologic changes accompanying pregnan-
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cy that exacerbated the underlying pathology of pulmonary hypertension. The physiologic changes accompanying pregnancy at 10
weeks initiated the emergency situation. These
changes not only put the mother’s life at risk.
Rather, they put the mother’s life in peril.
Moreover, the life of the fetus was equally in
peril due to the pathologies of right heart failure and cardiogenic shock. Oxygen delivered to
the placenta and fetus is dependent on maternal arterial oxygen content and uterine blood
ﬂow. Decrease in maternal cardiac output and
decrease in blood oxygenation can adversely
affect fetal oxygenation; the uterus and placenta number among the organs becoming
hypoxic during this crisis. Further, maternal
hypotension may constrict the uterine artery,
decreasing blood ﬂow to the fetus.5
Therefore, on Nov. 5, 2009, mother and
fetus were both in the process of dying. Due
to the age of the fetus, there was no possibility
that it could survive outside the womb. Nor,
due to the mother’s heart failure and cardiogenic shock, was there any possibility that the
fetus could survive inside the womb. In short,
in spite of the best efforts of the mother and of
her medical staff, the fetus had become terminal, not because of a pathology of its own but
because of a pathology in its maternal environment. There was no longer any chance that
the life of this child could be saved. This is
crucial to note insofar as it establishes that at
the point of decision, it was not a case of saving
the mother or the child. It was not a matter of
choosing one life or the other. The child’s life,
because of natural causes, was in the process
of ending.
There was, however, a chance that the life of
the mother could be saved. There was one possibility for treating and reversing the pathology of the emergent conditions of right heart
failure and cardiogenic shock. The intervention for treating this pathology was to eliminate the cause of the increased blood volume
and increased demand for cardiac output. The
cause of this increased blood ﬂow and cardiac
demand was not the fetus but rather the placenta — an organ in its own right. This requires
clariﬁcation.
Until about nine weeks into a pregnancy,
the ovaries are responsible for the production
of progesterone, which maintains the pregnancy in the uterus and causes the increase in
blood volume cited above. At about 10 weeks,
the placenta is the organ that takes over this
work, becoming a shared organ between the
mother and the child. In this case, having
reached week 11, the placenta was producing
the physiological changes that imperiled the
mother’s and child’s lives. No organ, however,

exists in a vacuum. The human body is a complex and carefully balanced network.
In this case, the normal functioning of an
organ (the placenta) within a diseased network (of pulmonary arteries) created a lethal
situation. Importantly, although in one respect
the placenta was functioning “normally,” it was
also functioning pathologically in two ways.
First, once the placenta initiated its normal
function at week 10, a crisis was created.
Second, once the patient entered cardiogenic
shock, the placenta also became hypoxic. In
these two ways, then, the placenta not only
initiated a threat to the mother’s life; it also
became the immediate/presenting cause of
the inevitably fatal threat to the fetus.

“The child’s life, because of natural causes, was in the process of
ending.”

These facts are important to establish
because the claim has been made that the
hospital sought primarily to end the life of the
fetus as the means to saving the mother’s life.
This, however, is physiologically inaccurate. It
is likely that in this case as in many cases of
natural fetal demise, the death of the fetus in
se would have had no physiologic effect on the
mother.
In many cases of fetal demise, the pregnancy itself continues; fetal death is often not
detected for weeks or months, although the
pregnancy itself continues to proceed and
develop because the hormones required for
sustaining and advancing the pregnancy come
not from the fetus but from the placenta.
Based on these facts, the ethics committee
at St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center was
asked for a determination of whether or not
the intervention to address the placental issue
via a dilation and curettage would be morally
appropriate according to Catholic teaching.
Per their reading of the “Ethical and Religious
Directives for Catholic Health Care Services”
(4th edition) and their understanding of the
Catholic moral tradition, the ethics committee
determined that the intervention would not be
considered a direct abortion. They therefore
approved the intervention, which was carried
out on Nov. 5, 2009.
Moral Analysis
The primary question in this case is whether
the ethics committee at St. Joseph’s Hospital
and Medical Center was correct in their determination that the intervention did not consti-

the pregnancy will aggravate an existing condition,
we should never accuse the
child of being a threat to the
mother.
“In difﬁcult situations when
the mother’s life is threatened
by an underlying condition,
the solution can never be
to directly kill her unborn
child. To do so is an abortion.
A dilation and curettage or
dilation and extraction procedure in this context is the
same thing as an abortion
since it is the direct killing of
an unborn child. The reason
for such a procedure never
matters. It is also important
to note that the secondary
intention or goal does not
change the moral evil of this
act. As John Paul II taught
infallibly in his encyclical
‘The Gospel of Life’:
“‘I declare that direct abortion, that is, abortion willed
as an end or as a means,
always constitutes a grave
moral disorder, since it is
the deliberate killing of an
innocent human being.
This doctrine is based upon
the natural law and upon
the written word of God, is
transmitted by the church’s
tradition, and taught by the
ordinary and universal magisterium’ (No. 62).

“What Can Be Done?
“So what can be done in such
a situation? That depends
upon the actual pathology or
illness. The pathology should
always be treated, to the
extent possible, all the while
remembering that there are
two patients who are at risk.
When treating the illness,
physicians should always try
to protect the life of the child,
who has just as much a right
to life as the mother.
“In the best of circumstances
a physician will treat the
mother’s pathology and
hold off on more aggressive
treatment until the child is
past the point of viability,
at which time labor can be
induced. Sometimes, however, the actual pathology
must be treated prior to the
viability of the child and may
indirectly cause the death of
the child.
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“This situation is altogether
different from a dilation and
curettage, since a dilation
and curettage is the dismembering and removing of the
body of the child. A dilation
and curettage or dilation
and extraction in this circumstance is the same as an
abortion, since it is the direct
killing of the child.
“There is a signiﬁcant difference, morally speaking,
between directly killing
versus allowing a child to die
as an unintended side effect
of life-saving treatment. A
similar, although not completely analogous, distinction
is made between murder and
self-defense. The end result
is the same, but the action
taken and the circumstances
change the way we evaluate
the end result. Once again,
the end does not justify the
means.

“The Catholic Position
“Today we often hear people
say, ‘I’m against abortion
unless in cases of rape, incest
or situations that threaten
the life of the mother.’ The
Catholic position is much
simpler; ‘we are always
against abortion.’ Every abortion is murder since it constitutes the unjust killing of
an innocent life. Thus, it can
never be justiﬁed under any
circumstance.
“The question might arise,
‘Isn’t it better to save one life
as opposed to allowing two
people to die?’ One thing we
must always remember is
that no physician can predict
what will happen with 100
percent accuracy. We will
never be able to eliminate
all risks associated with
pregnancy. What we should
not do, however, is lower risks
associated with pregnancy
by aborting children. It is not
better for a woman to have to
live the rest of her existence
knowing that she had her
child killed because her pregnancy was high risk.
“When we try to control every
possible situation in life,
we end up playing the role
of God. As people of faith
we know that our lives are
always in God’s hands. In

540
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tute a direct abortion and was therefore justiﬁable according to the Catholic moral tradition.
“Direct” is a technical term in the Catholic
moral tradition, as is “abortion.” Therefore, an
extended presentation of the tradition in this
regard is required to evaluate the committee’s
decision.
Magisterial Teaching
Catholic Healthcare West strives to embody
the fundamental commitment of the Catholic
faith “to promote and defend human dignity
... the foundation of [our tradition’s] concern
to respect the sacredness of every human life
from the moment of conception until death.”6
They understand this commitment to
embody a preferential option for those who are
the most vulnerable, including and especially
those persons who are not yet born.7
Consequently, direct abortions are forbidden in all Catholic Healthcare West hospitals.
Catholic Healthcare West bases this decision on magisterial teaching on abortion and
intrinsically evil acts. Important magisterial
documents here include: The “Declaration on
Procured Abortion” (1974), Veritatis Splendor
(1993) and Evangelium Vitae (1995). Key
passages from these documents are provided below. As the “Declaration on Procured
Abortion” states:
“Divine law and natural reason, therefore,
exclude all right to the direct killing of an innocent man. However, if the reasons given to
justify an abortion were always manifestly evil
and valueless the problem would not be so dramatic. The gravity of the problem comes from
the fact that in certain cases, perhaps in quite a
considerable number of cases, by denying abortion one endangers important values to which it
is normal to attach great value, and which may
sometimes even seem to have priority. We do
not deny these very great difﬁculties. It may be
a serious question of health, sometimes of life
or death, for the mother. ... We proclaim only
that none of these reasons can ever objectively
confer the right to dispose of another’s life.”8
Veritatis Splendor includes abortion among
its long list of intrinsically evil acts, which it
describes as follows:
“Reason attests that there are objects of the
human act which are by their nature ‘incapable of being ordered’ to God, because they
radically contradict the good of the person
made in his image. These are the acts which, in
the church’s moral tradition, have been termed
‘intrinsically evil’ (intrinsece malum): They are
such always and per se, in other words, on
account of their very object, and quite apart
from the ulterior intentions of the one acting
and the circumstances. Consequently, without

in the least denying the inﬂuence on morality
exercised by circumstances and especially by
intentions, the church teaches that ‘there exist
acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously
wrong by reason of their object.’”9
These teachings were reiterated by John
Paul II in Evangelium Vitae:
“Procured abortion is the deliberate and
direct killing, by whatever means it is carried
out, of a human being in the initial phase of his
or her existence, extending from conception
to birth. ... It is true that the decision to have
an abortion is often tragic and painful for the
mother, insofar as the decision to rid herself of
the fruit of conception is not made for purely
selﬁsh reasons or out of convenience, but out
of a desire to protect certain important values
such as her own health. ... I declare that direct
abortion, that is, abortion willed as an end or
as a means, always constitutes a grave moral
disorder, since it is the deliberate killing of an
innocent human being.”10
While never wavering from this position,
magisterial teaching has also afﬁrmed an
important nuance in the Catholic tradition,
namely, that not all interventions that result
in the death of the fetus qualify as abortions.
Pius XII’s “Address to the Associations of Large
Families” (Nov. 26, 1951) states this position
most clearly. He provides the foundation for
the magisterial teaching outlined above, noting: “The direct attack on an innocent life, as a
means to an end — in the present case to the
end of saving another life — is illicit.”11 Yet he
also goes on to explicitly clarify an important
dimension of this position, namely, the qualiﬁer “direct”:
“It has been our intention here to use
always the expressions ‘direct attempt on the
life of the innocent person,’ ‘direct killing.’ The
reason is that if, for example, the safety of the
future mother, independently of her state of
pregnancy, might call for an urgent surgical
operation, or any other therapeutic application, which would have as an accessory consequence, in no way desired or intended, but
inevitable, the death of the fetus, such an act
could not be called a direct attempt on the
innocent life. In these conditions the operations can be lawful, as can other similar medical interventions, provided that it be a matter
of great importance, such as life, and that it is
not possible to postpone it till the birth of the
child, or to have recourse to any other efﬁcacious remedy.”12
This passage clarifies three essential
points.13
First, “direct” is characterized as having the
desire, intention or will to kill. Actions in which

the death of the fetus is not desired, intended
or willed cannot “be called a direct attempt on
the innocent life.” Second, it suggests that the
opposite of “direct” is “nondirect” rather than
“indirect.” The term “indirect” suggests that
an agent could “indirectly will” an end, which
is not descriptively accurate, per Pius. Rather,
the agent is not willing, desiring or intending
the “accessory consequence”; therefore, “nondirect” (or “nonwilled”) seems more accurate.
Third, Pius makes clear that the term “direct”
is a description of a moral act, not a physical
act; in other words, whether the operation/
therapeutic application causes the inevitable
death of the fetus in a physically direct or indirect manner does not enter into his argument.

“Due to the age of the fetus, there
was no possibility that it could
survive outside the womb. Nor, due
to the mother’s heart failure and

its moral object? Was it, in other words, a direct
killing, a “deliberate or intentional” action in
which the death of the fetus was “willed as an
end or a means”?
2. If not, ought the intervention be properly understood as an action that had a different moral object but also had a nondirect (not
desired, intended or willed) accessory consequence of the inevitable death of the fetus (a
category allowed by the tradition as morally
acceptable in certain cases)?
3. Or, is it the case that given the inevitable
and immediate demise of the fetus (due to
lack of viability and lack of oxygenation), it
is not accurate to even speak of the death of
the fetus as an accessory consequence of the
intervention?
To address these questions requires a
brief overview of the Thomistic notion of the
“moral object.” I will then outline the reasoning and conclusions of two leading scholars
of the Catholic moral tradition who speciﬁcally address cases analogous to the one that
occurred at St. Joseph’s.

these situations the reality of
our dependence upon him
becomes ever more clear and
pronounced.”

Father Ehrich’s statement,
along with many other documents, can be found on a
website set up by the Diocese
of Phoenix,
www.arizonacatholic.org.

The Jan. 13, 2011, edition
of Origins, Vol. 40, No. 31,
includes a statement by
Phoenix Bishop Thomas J.
Olmsted and a document
from St. Joseph’s Hospital and
Medical Center. The margin
notes section of that edition
also includes more information.

cardiogenic shock, was there any
possibility that the fetus could survive inside the womb.”

These clariﬁcations are noteworthy because
the classical tradition at times refers to certain
interventions (such as those described by Pius
XII above) as “indirect abortions.” This language of “indirect” has carried over into the
contemporary literature and is still, at times,
used within the Catholic literature.
Such a description, however, is predicated
upon a confusion of the Thomistic notion of
the moral object of an action, has led to a misapplication of the principle of double effect
and suggests that there could be exceptions
to the absolute moral norm prohibiting the
intrinsically evil act of abortion.
Moreover, it is notable that none of the
magisterial documents cited above — nor, as
we shall see, the June 23, 2010, statement entitled “The Distinction Between Direct Abortion
and Legitimate Medical Procedures” issued by
the USCCB Committee on Doctrine — use the
phrase “indirect abortion.”
Therefore, these documents, in addition
to the Catholic moral tradition at large, make
clear that direct, deliberately willed abortion is
intrinsically evil and, as such, never justiﬁable.
The questions central to our particular case,
therefore, are:
1. Was the procedure that occurred at St.
Joseph’s Hospital on Nov. 5, 2009, in this case
properly described as an “abortion,” in terms of

The Moral Object
Determining the object of an act is one
of the most critical steps in moral analysis.
Understanding how the moral object is constituted in an act, however, remains one of
the most difﬁcult and complex components
of Catholic moral theology. The notion of the
moral object was articulated by St. Thomas
Aquinas in the Summa Theologica (I-II, Q
18-21), which formed the basis of the development of the subsequent Catholic moral tradition.
Many leading contemporary Thomistic
scholars hold, however, that with Thomas’
neo-Scholastic interpreters and much of the
classical tradition, important nuances in the
understanding of the moral object — and,
indeed, of the morality of human actions
— were lost. This resulted in methodological problems in 20th-century Catholic moral
theology, problems to which revisionism and
proportionalism attempted to respond, unfortunately creating a whole host of new methodological problems.
One of the most valuable contributions of
Veritatis Splendor has been the renewed attention it has brought to the notion of the moral
object. William J. Murphy Jr., associate professor of moral theology at the Pontiﬁcal College
Josephinum in Columbus, Ohio, and editor of
the Josephinum Journal of Theology, highlights
six speciﬁc afﬁrmations about the moral object
offered by John Paul II in §78. Echoing Pius XII,
John Paul II reiterates that the moral object
of an action is determined by the proximate
origins
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end deliberately chosen by the will (in
conformity with reason). In John Paul II’s
words:14
“The morality of the human act
depends primarily and fundamentally on
the ‘object’ rationally chosen by the deliberate will” (emphasis in original).
“In order to be able to grasp the object
of an act which speciﬁes that act morally,
it is therefore necessary to place oneself
in the perspective of the acting person”
(emphasis in original).
“The object of the act of willing is a
freely chosen kind of behavior.” “It is in
conformity with the order of reason.”
“By the object of a given moral act,
then, one cannot mean a process or an
event of the merely physical order, to
be assessed on the basis of its ability to
bring about a given state of affairs in the
outside world.”
“Rather, that object is the proximate
end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the
acting person.”
Moreover, as Murphy notes, “in insisting that this moral object must not be
understood as ‘a process or an event of
the merely physical order,’ John Paul’s
primary target was revisionist theory,
which inherited what might be called
‘a physical understanding of the moral
object’ from the post-Tridentine casuist
tradition. The pope’s approach, however,
also challenges many more traditional
Thomists, who sometimes treat the
object that determines the morality of
the human act as something of the merely physical order, or as what is caused
physically.”15
Nonetheless, the “exterior act” is not
irrelevant — together the “interior act of
the will” and the “exterior act” comprise
one act. However, it is clear from Thomas
that moral actions get their object —
their “form” — from the interior act of
the will.16
Murphy describes this complex balance as follows:
“A proper description of the moral
object would not be my arm, which is a
thing of the physical order, and not simply raising my arm, which lacks reference
to an end — but raising my arm in order
to greet someone; not removing Tom’s
watch, but removing Tom’s watch to play
a trick or removing Tom’s watch to appropriate it; not shooting someone, but
shooting someone to repel his aggression
or shooting someone to carry out capi542
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tal punishment or shooting someone to
bring about their death; not taking an
anovulant pill, but taking an anovulant
pill to prevent the procreative consequences of the marital act or taking an
anovulant pill to treat endometriosis.”17
A proper description of the moral
object, then, certainly includes the “exterior act” — since it is a necessary part
of the moral action as a whole — but it
derives its properly moral content ﬁrst
and foremost from the proximate end
deliberately chosen by the will. Thus,
the object is named as greeting a friend,
repelling aggression, capital punishment, murder, contraception or healing.
It is absolutely necessary to emphasize, then, that in the Catholic tradition,
the moral object of an act is not equivalent or reducible to its physical/material
component. Three examples might help
to clarify this point.
First, as mentioned by Murphy, the
object of the action of taking an anovulant pill cannot be construed only in
terms of the physical act of taking the pill.
The object of the act — as either “contraception” or “therapy” — is determined
by the end or intention chosen rationally
by the deliberate will. Therefore, if the
intention of taking such a pill is to prevent conception the moral object of the
action is contraception, which is by its
species intrinsically evil. If the intention
of taking the same pill, in the same manner, is to treat endometriosis, the moral
object of the action is healing, which by
its species is good.
Second, St. Thomas himself offers
the example of killing in self-defense.
In doing so, he explicitly intends to differentiate between actions which, in
the physical order, may look exactly the
same, but in terms of their species (good
or evil) are radically different because of
their different moral objects. What differentiates actions of the object “selfdefense” (good moral object) from those
of the object “homicide” (intrinsically
evil moral object) is the intention or end
of the agent, which is either to preserve
his or her own life or to end the life of
another.
Importantly, in this passage in the
Summa, Thomas does not attend to the
physical/material component of the
action. The self-defender may have used
a variety of agents in a variety of ways
(e.g., hitting the assailant over the head
with a tire iron; pushing the assailant

over a cliff, etc.). Prima facie, an observer
cannot immediately determine to which
moral species this action belongs; only
when it is understood “from the perspective of the acting person”18 and evaluated
according to the acting person’s intention can we know the proper object and
species.19
Third, a woman could be faced with a
threat to her life due to pregnancy. That
woman could, via what would look physically/externally like one and the same
action to an external observer, pursue
two very different moral ends and therefore two very different species of moral
action, good or evil. She could deliberately will to sacriﬁce her life for her child,
based on a call to martyrdom. To do so,
she would reject certain kinds of medical interventions. However, she might
also have a history of depression, feel
oppressed by the demands of raising her
other children, perhaps have a history
of attempting to take her own life. She
could, via the same action above (rejecting certain kinds of medical interventions), intend to end her own life. In so
doing, the moral object of her act would
be “suicide” (intrinsically evil), not martyrdom, which would make her act evil
in species.
More examples could be offered, but I
hope these three are sufﬁcient to demonstrate that within Catholic moral theory,
there is a complex interplay between the
physical/exterior act (that which can
be observed by a third party) and the
actual moral act, which is comprised of
both the interior act of the will and the
exterior act, but whose object/species is
determined by the formal component,
the interior act of the will. The physical/
material action is not irrelevant to the
determination of the object, but it is also
not sufﬁcient.
More speciﬁcally, it is clear that within
the Catholic tradition not all surgical or
pharmacological interventions which
prima facie physically directly end the
life of a fetus fall into the species of acts
named “abortion.” As Pius XII noted,
the Catholic tradition holds that certain
medical interventions aimed at healing
a mother or saving her life that simultaneously cause fetal death (at the level of
physical causality) may be justiﬁed and
in fact are not categorized as “abortions.”
Justiﬁed via the principle of double
effect, the three primary types of such
interventions include:

—Surgical removal of a fallopian tube
containing a fetus.
—Surgical removal of a cancerous
uterus containing a fetus.
—Administration of chemotherapy or
other pharmaceuticals required to treat
maternal diseases or conditions which
may result in fetal death.
In these cases, precision of description and terminology is critically important. Such cases are not referred to —
and are not generally considered — to
be abortions, even though in the ﬁrst two
cases, a living fetus is surgically removed
from the mother’s body and in the third,
the pharmaceuticals may effectively be
abortifacient.
Signiﬁcantly, the recent statement
from the Committee on Doctrine discusses these interventions but does not
refer to them as “abortions.” The object
of the act in these cases is deemed to
be properly described as “beneﬁtting the
health of the mother” or, in some cases,
as “saving the life of the mother” (if, for
example, the fallopian tube has ruptured). These actions are not exceptions
to the norm prohibiting direct abortion.
These actions are properly described as
a different category of action because of
their different moral object, which is, in
the words of Veritatis Splendor, “capable
of being ordered to God.”20
The Moral Object of the Intervention
at St. Joseph’s Hospital
Two leading scholars of the Catholic
moral tradition bring the perspective of
Veritatis Splendor and a nuanced understanding of the Thomistic concept of
“moral object” to bear on cases analogous to the one at St. Joseph’s. I will here
draw on the analyses and arguments of
Father Martin Rhonheimer and Germain
Grisez to assess that case.21

Martin Rhonheimer
Father Martin Rhonheimer is a Catholic
priest, incardinated in the Prelature of the
Holy Cross and Opus Dei. He is currently
professor of ethics and political philosophy at the School of Philosophy of the
Pontiﬁcal University of the Holy Cross in
Rome. His writings have focused speciﬁcally on the work of Thomas Aquinas as
well as abortion and contraception.22
The following analysis relies on his
recent work Vital Conﬂicts in Medical
Ethics: A Virtue Approach to Craniotomy
and Tubal Pregnancies (Catholic

University of America Press, Washington,
D.C., 2009).23 Here he offers analyses
informed by the Summa Theologica and
Veritatis Splendor with regard to extrauterine pregnancy, particularly tubal or
ectopic pregnancies, and craniotomy for
obstructed delivery. 24
He considers craniotomy not because
it is a current procedure; contemporary advances in cesarean section have
rendered this question mostly moot.
However, he recognizes that: (a) craniotomy was a key case of debate for 19thand early 20th-century moral theologians and magisterial authors; (b) scholars on both sides of the debate relied
on problematic methodologies that
misconstrued Thomas; and (c) the question embodies key elements that continue to trouble contemporary debates
over potentially analogous interventions
(i.e., craniotomy, by deﬁnition, consists
in a physically direct intervention on the
fetus and therefore looks, from an external observer perspective, like an apparent morally direct attack on a child to
save the life of a mother).
Rhonheimer also focuses on these
two cases because in these cases medical personnel are faced with a situation
in which it is certain that without medical intervention, both mother and child
will die.
Rhonheimer agrees that direct abortion is intrinsically evil and can never be
justiﬁed. He speciﬁcally rejects any moral
methodology (i.e., proportionalism) that
involves the “weighing of goods”: “It is
morally impermissible,” he notes, “to
weigh two lives against each other and
to make a preferential choice.”25 Such a
method, he argues, entertains the possibility of choosing against the life of the
child, a possibility that is never permitted
in the Catholic moral tradition.
While many cases of obstetric conﬂict
do present such a possibility — the possibility of choosing against the life of the
mother or the life of the child — in certain instances the child’s chance of survival is negligibly small or, in fact, nonexistent. These cases, he argues, have a
distinguishing, morally relevant feature,
namely, that:
“Only the life of the mother is at the
disposal of another human being — the
fetus is no longer even subject to a decision between ‘killing or allowing to live’;
the only morally good thing that can
be chosen here is to save the life of the

mother.”26
With respect to the life or death of the
embryo, the question “to kill or let live”
can no longer be decided about or chosen. The only practical and moral question that remains regards the mother: “To
let die or save?” He also states clearly that
“the decision to allow both mother and
child to die — at least when the mother
can be saved and the child will die in any
case — is simply irrational”; this is not an
ad hominem comment but rather a very
speciﬁc Thomistic critique, based on the
critical role of reason in moral discernment and action.27
While the justiﬁcation for the classic
cases of maternal-fetal conﬂict in the
tradition (cancerous uterus, etc.) have
relied on the principle of double effect,
Rhonheimer argues that in cases where
there is no chance for the child to survive, the principle of double effect is not
applicable because there are not in fact
two effects.
Given that no action can save the life
of the child, its death effectively falls outside the scope of the moral description of
the action. Moreover, since there are not
two effects, one cannot argue that the
death of the child is a means to the end
of saving the life of the mother:
“In this case [of ectopic pregnancy
or craniotomy], the killing of the fetus
would not consist in a choice of the death
of a human being as a means to save the
life of the mother. … Only if the fetus
would otherwise survive could its death
be said to be chosen as a means — and
thus caused ‘directly’ in a morally relevant way. But in our case, the death of
the fetus is not willed in order to save
the mother; as far as the life of the fetus
is concerned, it is beyond any kind of
willing.”28
Here Rhonheimer follows St. Thomas
in his account of the moral object of the
act. He notes, as discussed above, that for
many analysts the “physical directness”
of the act seems highly signiﬁcant, but he
argues that it is not morally determinative. He maintains that the object of the
act in these cases is properly described as
“the saving of the mother’s life”:
“The killing of the fetus [in salpingectomy or craniotomy] falls here under
the pure and simple genus naturae of
the moral (intentional) act of ‘saving
the mother’s life.’ (Stated in Thomistic
terms: The fatal medical intervention by
which the fetus or embryo is removed is
origins
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the material part of the act, whereas the
basic intention or the ﬁnis proximus of
the life-saving act is the formal part of the
moral object of the act).”29
In these cases, where the fetus is
not dying at the time of the intervention but will not be able to survive due
to the imperiled state of the mother,
Rhonheimer argues that the death of the
fetus is “to be considered a purely physical evil caused praeter intentionem [outside of the moral intention].”30
This is shown, he argues, “by the fact
that one would not feel justiﬁed in performing the intervention if the child had
a real chance of survival. But in our case,
it is not only that the death of the embryo
is regretted ... but that it is decided to
perform the operation solely because it
is known — and regretted for this reason
— that the child will not survive. This is a
signiﬁcant difference.”31
He bases this analysis on Aquinas’
example of self-defense. Rejecting the
argument that obstetrical cases ought
to be understood under the rubric of
self-defense, he demonstrates that for
Aquinas, the object of the act of legitimate self-defense is “good” — even if it
involves a physically direct act of killing
— because the act of self-defense, on
the basis of its moral object, is an act of
“self-preservation,” which is a good. In
Rhonheimer’s words:
“What is effectively done here [in
Thomas’ case of self-defense] is nothing
other than an act of killing; but the intentio is the preservation of one’s life and,
because the act of killing occurs praeter
intentionem, the object of the action is
determined formally by the intention of
self-preservation. ... The parallel [to the
obstetrical case] consists only in this:
that an act can be an act of killing materialiter but something else entirely formaliter, e.g., self-preservation, the saving
of a life, medical therapy. The object of an
action is determined on the basis of the
formal aspect, not the material.”32
Consequently, he argues, certainly
interventions on extrauterine pregnancy
but also craniotomy are not properly
understood, per their object, as “abortion”:
“With respect to the moral object of
the action, this intervention has nothing
to do with an abortion; it is rather a therapeutic measure in favor of the woman,
with the only intentional content of the
action being the healing and the saving
544
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of the mother’s life.”33
Rhonheimer’s analysis is directly
applicable to the case at St. Joseph’s insofar as: (a) it is a case where both mother
and child are in immediate danger of
dying and (b) there is no chance that the
child can be saved. Even more clearly
than in cases of extrauterine gravidity
or the cancerous uterus, the child at St.
Joseph’s had already begun to die and his
or her death was, at the point of intervention, inevitable.

“A pathology threatened the
lives of both the pregnant
woman and her child, it was
not safe to wait or waiting
surely would have resulted in
the death of both, there was
no way to save the child and
an operation that could save
the mother’s life would, at
least prima facie, result in the
child’s death.”

Therefore, Rhonheimer would claim
that (a) one cannot properly in that
case speak of the intervention as having two effects; and (b) that even if one
could establish that the “matter” of the
action of the dilation and curettage was
or appeared to be a physically direct act
of killing, morally, the death of the child
would have been praeter intentionem,
outside the scope of the intention and
therefore outside of the proper moral
description of the action.
He holds the latter position both on
formal grounds (the intention of the
intervention was not to kill the child
but to save the mother) and on material grounds (that the child’s death was
inevitable and so therefore could not be
chosen).
Consequently, Rhonheimer would
likely argue that the object of the act of
intervention at St. Joseph’s was “saving
the life of the mother” or “legitimate
medical therapy,” not “abortion.”34 He
would also argue that there was no other
reasonable (in the Thomistic sense) or
morally good course of action that could
have been chosen or pursued.

Germain Grisez
Germain Grisez is a Catholic moral theologian and author of the magnum opus
three-volume treatment of Christian
morality entitled The Way of the Lord
Jesus (1983). Grisez spent his career
articulating a new form of natural law
thinking, deeply grounded in the work
of Thomas Aquinas and his interpreters,
and his work is thoroughly consonant
with the teachings of the magisterium.
In addition to works on natural law, he
has consistently written on questions of
contraception and abortion. He is currently emeritus professor of Christian
ethics at Mount St. Mary’s University in
Emmitsburg, Md.
In Volume 2 of The Way of the Lord
Jesus, subtitled Living a Christian Life,
Grisez takes up the question, “Is abortion
always the wrongful killing of a person?”35
As with Rhonheimer, Grisez’s argument
again centers on the concept of the
moral object with speciﬁc attention to
intention. As he notes, “Intentional killing is synonymous with another expression sometimes found in the church’s
teaching: direct killing,”36 but yet “one
can knowingly cause something without
intending it.”37
In other words, Grisez argues, following Pius XII, one can knowingly cause
a death without it being a direct killing.
By this logic, not all intentional abortion involves intentional killing; in other
words, “someone might choose to abort
without choosing to kill.”38
Grisez posits two scenarios where one
might choose to abort without choosing
to kill, those situations in which:
“A woman suffering from kidney
disease becomes pregnant and wants
to avoid the health problems that will
result from carrying the child, or a
woman becomes pregnant as a result of
rape and wants to be freed of her ongoing suffering. In either case, and perhaps
in a few others, in seeking abortion the
precise object of the pregnant woman’s
choice might be, not the baby’s death or
any consequence of it. On this assumption, the proposal adopted is, not to kill
the unborn baby, but to have him or her
removed from the womb, with death
as a foreseen and accepted side effect.
An abortion carrying out such a choice
would not be an intentional killing.”39
He continues on to argue that even
though these cases would count as “abortion” but would not count as intentional

killing, it would still be wrong to abort the
child or accept the baby’s death.40 Simply
because it is not an intentional killing, for
Grisez, does not make it justiﬁable.
The only circumstance in which
Grisez holds that it would be licit to
accept the baby’s death would be to save
the mother’s life, and then only when
certain conditions are met.41 He argues
as follows:
“Sometimes the baby’s death may be
accepted to save the mother. Sometimes
four conditions are simultaneously fulﬁlled: (i) some pathology threatens the
lives of both a pregnant woman and her
child, (ii) it is not safe to wait or waiting
will surely result in the death of both, (iii)
there is no way to save the child, and (iv)
an operation that can save the mother’s
life will result in the child’s death.
“If the operation was one of those
which the classical moralists considered
not to be a ‘direct’ abortion, they held
that it could be performed. For example,
in cases in which the baby could not
be saved regardless of what was done
(and perhaps in some others as well),
they accepted the removal of a cancerous
gravid uterus or of a fallopian tube containing an ectopic pregnancy. This moral
norm plainly is sound, since the operation does not carry out a proposal to kill
the child, serves a good purpose and violates neither fairness nor mercy.”42
He recognizes that some moralists, both classical and contemporary,
would classify certain other procedures
as “‘direct killing,’ since the procedure
in question would lead to the baby’s
death.”43 Like Rhonheimer, he cites the
question of craniotomy for obstructed
delivery. He wishes to challenge this
position and does so as follows:
“However, assuming the four conditions are met, the baby’s death need not
be included in the proposal adopted in
choosing to do a craniotomy. The proposal can be simply to alter the child’s
physical dimensions and remove him or
her because, as a physical object, this
body cannot remain where it is without
ending in both the baby’s and the mother’s deaths. To understand this proposal,
it helps to notice that the baby’s death
contributes nothing to the objective
sought; indeed, the procedure is exactly
the same if the baby has already died.
“In adopting this proposal, the baby’s
death need only be accepted as a side
effect. Therefore … even craniotomy

(and, a fortiori, other operations meeting
the four stated conditions) need not be
direct killing, and so, provided the death
of the baby is not intended (which is possible but unnecessary), any operation in
a situation meeting the four conditions
could be morally acceptable.”44

“The purpose of a dilation and curettage in and of
itself is not, as the National
Catholic Bioethics Center
states repeatedly, ‘the dismemberment of a fetus.’”
In the subsequent section, he makes
clear that “sometimes the baby’s life
should be given priority”45 and that “if
the mother’s life is not at stake, it is unfair
to accept the baby’s death.”46 But he also
emphasizes that “in a situation in which
the lives of both a pregnant woman and
her child are at stake and both cannot be
saved, if an operation can be performed
with a prospect of saving one or the
other, fairness can require the procedure
more likely to save at least one.”47
Again, the application to the case at
St. Joseph’s Hospital is clear. The case
clearly meets Grisez’s four criteria: (i) a
pathology threatened the lives of both
the pregnant woman and her child, (ii)
it was not safe to wait or waiting surely
would have resulted in the death of both,
(iii) there was no way to save the child,
and (iv) an operation that could save the
mother’s life would, at least prima facie,
result in the child’s death.
Grisez would therefore likely hold that
the intervention enacted at St. Joseph’s
ought not be categorized as a direct killing, for the baby’s death was not what
was intended.
As mentioned earlier, Rhonheimer
explicitly argues that in such cases, the
moral object is not “abortion” properly
speaking but rather “saving the life of the
mother.” Grisez includes the foregoing
discussion under a general heading “Ch.
8, Question D: Is Abortion Always the
Wrongful Killing of a Person?,” suggesting that even these interventions ought
to be named “abortion” but ought also to
be considered “indirect” since the death
of the child is outside of the intention of
the agent/act.

Importantly, however, in the section
where Grisez outlines the above argument, he does not use the term “abortion.” In the preceding sections, he clearly uses the term (Ch. 8, D3b: “Sometimes
intentional abortion does not involve
intentional killing”; Ch. 8, D3c: “Abortion,
even if not intentional killing, usually is
wrong”).
Yet when he moves to discuss cases
meeting these four criteria, the word
“abortion” disappears: the heading for
the section is “Ch. 8, D3d: Sometimes the
baby’s death may be accepted to save the
mother”; and the word “abortion” only
appears once in this discussion, and not
in relation to interventions which result
in or accept the death of the child.
It appears that Grisez wants to suggest that not only are cases meeting these
four criteria properly identiﬁed as “indirect,” but that their object is not “abortion” but rather “saving the mother’s life.”
Analogies to Cases
Therefore, should any ethics committee
at a Catholic hospital research the literature on this question, they would obtain
a consensus opinion from two leading
conservative scholars of the Catholic
moral tradition, both of whom have written in defense of Humanae Vitae, who
are expert scholars of Thomas Aquinas,
are dedicated to Veritatis Splendor and
Evangelium Vitae, and who have made
clear their dedication to magisterial
teaching.48
That opinion would have supported
the conclusion reached by the ethics
committee at St. Joseph’s Hospital and
Medical Center.
The ethics committee’s deliberations were also no doubt inﬂuenced by
the general knowledge within Catholic
health care of the obstetrical cases mentioned above that are understood to
be justiﬁed according to Directive 48.
Reasoning analogously from these cases
would lead the committee to:
a. Attempt to rely on the principle of
double effect, although both Rhonheimer
and Grisez suggest that in these particular cases, there are no longer two effects.
b. Reason that in the cases of a cancerous uterus, ectopic pregnancy or chemotherapy, the intervention does in fact
physically directly kill the child although
it is understood to be “indirect” on the
moral level; therefore, the committee
would likely have viewed the intervenorigins
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tion proposed in this case (dilation and
curettage to detach the placenta) to be
analogous, and perhaps less grave, given
that here the child was already in the
process of dying.
c. Understand that given the terminal
condition of the baby, the moral object of
the intervention was properly described
as “saving the life of the mother.”
Evaluation of Analyses and Statements
As part of this analysis, an evaluation
of the opinion offered by the National
Catholic Bioethics Center was requested.
A comment on the applicability of the
statement by the Committee on Doctrine
of the USCCB was also requested. These
follow below.
The National Catholic Bioethics Center
Analysis — June 11, 2010
The National Catholic Bioethics Center
offers a number of objections to the
intervention at St. Joseph’s Hospital.
First, they claim: “The pregnancy was
seen as a pathology. However, there was
no evidence of any pathology of the
reproductive organs, nor of the fetus, its
placenta or its membranes.”
Here the National Catholic Bioethics
Center draws too stark a distinction
between particular organs and the entire
physiological system of which they are a
part. I do not mean here to invoke the
principle of totality; rather, this is simply
a biological fact. While some pathologies
can be localized to a particular organ or
site, most pathologies, particularly those
that are life-threatening, cannot be
restricted in this manner.
Pulmonary hypertension is, on one
level, “located” in the lungs; but insofar as the lungs are critical for the oxygenation of the blood, which is critically
important for the entire physiological organism, and insofar as immediate effects of this pathology are cardiac
impairment, and so forth, it is difﬁcult to
accept an argument which attempts to
simply localize pathology.
As noted in Part I above, it can be
legitimately, medically argued that the
pregnancy resulted in physiological
changes that exacerbated an underlying
pathology, resulting in two new critical
pathologies (right heart failure and cardiogenic shock), all of which created a
pathological and ultimately fatal context
for the fetus.
Second, the National Catholic
546
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Bioethics Center rejects Catholic
Healthcare West’s use of the phrase “termination of pregnancy” and suggests,
without charity, that it is best understood
as “misleading terminology which hides
the truth.” Precision in terminology is,
however, critical to the work of moral
analysis, as the foregoing account has
demonstrated.

“The material intervention
here was equally or potentially less of a direct attack on the
child than other obstetrical
interventions justiﬁed within
the Catholic tradition.”
Given the clinical facts of the situation, the phrase “termination of pregnancy” is an accurate medical description of what the intervention was trying
to achieve (to terminate the burden of
the pregnancy, not to kill the child); “save
the life of the mother” is an accurate
moral description of the intervention.
Third, while I agree with Rhonheimer
that this case does not fall under the
principle of double effect, I believe the
National Catholic Bioethics Center analysis of the principle of double effect in
this case is inadequate on a number of
counts:
1. The ﬁrst criterion for the principle
of double effect requires that the action
be good or morally neutral in and of
itself. The National Catholic Bioethics
Center response to this criterion begs
the question. “Action” here has traditionally been understood as the most basic
description of the action itself. For example, when the principle of double effect is
used to justify the use of narcotic agents
that might hasten death, the response to
the ﬁrst criterion is usually framed as follows: “The use of narcotics to treat pain
is a morally acceptable and even good
medical action.”
Following this model, one would
begin an analysis of the intervention at
St. Joseph’s using the principle of double
effect by noting that the procedure of
dilation and curettage is, in and of itself,
a morally neutral and most often a good
medical intervention. A dilation and
curettage is used in a variety of gynecological situations as a legitimate therapy.

It is most commonly used to treat
disorders resulting in abnormal bleeding, polyps and incomplete miscarriages,
and management of placental issues. It is
only rarely used as a method of abortion
(2.4 percent of the cases of abortion in
the U.S.49). Therefore, the purpose of a
dilation and curettage in and of itself is
not, as the National Catholic Bioethics
Center states repeatedly, “the dismemberment of a fetus.”
Furthermore, as Rhonheimer notes:
“One could add ... that neither is the principle of double effect suited to determining the ‘species’ of an action according
to its object. Indeed, every application of
the principle of double effect presupposes (in accordance with the ﬁrst condition
...) that the act performed is already seen
as good or at least indifferent according
to its object. But the controversial and
most delicate cases are precisely those
in which it is not clear what the object
of the chosen and performed act actually is.”50
2. Similarly, regarding the second criterion, the National Catholic Bioethics
Center seems unduly focused on the
notion of the “dismemberment of the
fetus.” To claim that what was “intended
in the procedure was the dismembering of the fetus in order to remove it”
can only be made by disregarding all that
Catholic Healthcare West has said about
this case.
This also stands in direct contradiction to John Paul II’s clear position that
“in order to be able to grasp the object of
an act which speciﬁes that act morally,
it is therefore necessary to place oneself
in the perspective of the acting person.”51
As demonstrated with Rhonheimer
above, the formal intention of the acting person (or in this case persons), not
the material action, deﬁnes the moral
object. On no basis can it be argued that
what was intended in this case was the
dismemberment of the fetus insofar as:
a. The mother and medical staff had,
to this point, done all in their power to
promote the life of the child.
b. Ending the life of the child per se
would have no effect on the medical
condition of the mother. Therefore, the
death of the child could not be intended
as a means to the end of saving the life of
the mother. An act cannot be intended
as a means to an end if it will not accomplish that end. The intentional object of
the procedure centered on the placenta,

which was medically and physiologically
the cause of the crisis.
c. The “attack” on the placenta does
not differ, from the perspective of the
fetus, from the “attack” on the cancerous uterus — in both cases, the organ is
a maternal/fetal organ upon which the
fetus is vitally dependent.
d. In the current situation, however,
because of the mother’s loss of heart
function, the placenta was no longer fulﬁlling its life-sustaining function vis à vis
the child but was imperiling the life of
both the mother and the child.
e. The National Catholic Bioethics
Center claims that in discussions with
physicians, no physicians believe it is
practically possible to perform a dilation
and curettage without dismemberment.
However, this fact is clinically disputed.
f. Catholic Healthcare West states
clearly that the physicians took every
effort to avoid harming the child, though
it is, of course, difﬁcult to do so. A similar risk to the fetus holds, however, in
cases of extracting a cancerous uterus
or removing an ectopic pregnancy. In
the case of the chemotherapeutic agents
ingested by a cancer-ridden mother, the
chemotherapy poisons the child. The
material intervention here was equally
or potentially less of a direct attack on
the child than other obstetrical interventions justiﬁed within the Catholic tradition.
3. The fetal death was in no way the
cause of or necessary to bringing about
the good effect (the alleviation of the cardiac overload). Fetal dying had already
initiated with the medical crisis of the
mother, and the medical crisis of the
mother would have continued to exacerbate even if the fetus had died before the
mother underwent any external intervention. This was established in Part I
above.
Fetal demise happens frequently with
no effect on pregnancy; in this instance,
it was the pregnancy that was imperiling the mother, a pregnancy that could
no longer sustain the fetus. It was not
the child that was imperiling the mother.
The death of the child, therefore, could
not medically be the means toward the
good end of saving the mother’s life.
As mentioned above, the National
Catholic Bioethics Center analysis focuses quite intently on the image of the dismemberment of the fetus. In light of John
Paul II and Rhonheimer, I would argue

that in doing so they reduce the object of
the act to the physical action of the dilation and curettage and in doing so fail to
offer an accurate, Thomistic account of
the moral object of the action in keeping
with the Catholic moral tradition.
Statement of the USCCB Committee on
Doctrine — June 23, 2010
The Committee on Doctrine also offered a
brief clariﬁcation on some questions that
can arise in obstetrical situations in their
June 23, 2010, statement entitled “The
Distinction Between Direct Abortion and
Legitimate Medical Procedures.”

“The Committee on Doctrine
statement does not address
the situation faced by St.
Joseph’s Hospital where two
lives were in peril and it was
clear that the child was in the
process of dying and would
die shortly.”
They offer two scenarios. The ﬁrst
scenario they offer is the case of a direct
abortion, one in which “a pregnant
woman is experiencing problems with
one or more of her organs, apparently as
a result of the added burden of pregnancy,” and a surgical intervention “directly
targets the life of the unborn child. ...
The surgery does not directly address
the health problem of the woman, for
example, by repairing the organ that is
malfunctioning. The surgery is likely to
improve the functioning of the organ or
organs, but only in an indirect way, i.e.,
by lessening the overall demands placed
upon the organ or organs, since the
burden posed by the pregnancy will be
removed. The abortion is the means by
which a reduced strain upon the organ
or organs is achieved.”52
The second scenario they offer is
that of the cancerous uterus discussed
above and they correctly note that such
procedures “indirectly and unintentionally (although foreseeably) result[s] in the
death of the unborn child. In this case
the surgery directly addresses the health
problem of the woman. ... The woman’s
health beneﬁts directly from the surgery.
The surgery does not directly target the

life of the unborn child. The death of the
child is an unintended and unavoidable
side effect and not the aim of the surgery.”53
The Committee on Doctrine does
not draw any conclusions about the St.
Joseph case in this brief. However, per
the foregoing analysis, John Paul II,
Rhonheimer and even Grisez would likely argue that their analysis conﬂates the
notion of direct/indirect with medical/
physical directness. As we have seen, the
notion of direct/indirect applies to the
will and intention of the agent vis à vis
the moral object of the act as a whole, not
to the directness of the medical intervention vis à vis either a pathological organ
or the fetus.
The Committee on Doctrine statement does not address the situation
faced by St. Joseph’s Hospital where two
lives were in peril and it was clear that
the child was in the process of dying and
would die shortly. As we have seen, in
that situation, an intervention cannot
effectively directly or indirectly result in
the death of the child.
Had the mother followed her physician’s advice at 7 1/2 weeks, then clearly,
the mother would have found herself in
the committee’s ﬁrst scenario, undergoing a direct abortion. As we have noted,
however, she steadfastly refused to have
a direct abortion because of her Catholic
faith.
It is my understanding that St. Joseph’s
Hospital understood its intervention to
most closely resemble the second scenario offered by the Committee on Doctrine.
I would suggest that it is notable, per our
discussion of Rhonheimer above, that the
committee does not use the term “abortion” in that scenario and instead refers
to it under the auspice of a different (and
accurate) object: “legitimate medical
intervention.” Following the Committee
on Doctrine, St. Joseph’s Hospital would
be justiﬁed in understanding the intervention they authorized as a “legitimate
medical intervention.”
Summary
In summation, the ethics committee at
St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center,
fully aware of the magisterial teaching
on direct abortion, was faced with a
scenario in which they needed to discern whether the proposed intervention
would: (a) properly be described as an
abortion in the moral sense; or (b) if it
origins
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rather entailed a different moral object.
Given the medical facts of the case, it
was germane to their deliberation that in
this instance it was not a matter of weighing one life against another or choosing
one life over another; they were faced
with a scenario in which without action
both mother and child would die and
that regardless of the course of action,
the child was now terminal.
Their decision to proceed with the
dilation and curettage to relieve the
pressure placed by the placenta on the
mother’s cardiovascular system in order
to address the immediate pathologies of
right-side heart failure and cardiogenic
shock and thereby save the mother’s life
would ﬁnd full support from the careful, rigorous arguments provided by two
of the Catholic moral tradition’s leading
ﬁgures, Father Martin Rhonheimer and
Germain Grisez.
Analysis of the works of both of these
authors also suggests that the action
taken at St. Joseph’s is fully in keeping
with the position of Veritatis Splendor.
Following the opinions of these
authors, I would argue that the intervention that occurred at St. Joseph’s
Hospital on Nov. 5, 2009, cannot properly
be described as an “abortion,” in terms
of its moral object. At most, the effect
on the child can only be categorized as
“indirect,” which is morally permitted by
the Catholic tradition.
Most important, the death of the child
was not willed, either by the mother or
the medical staff; the child was a deeply
wanted child. Effecting the death of the
child would not achieve any medical or
ancillary end. Therefore the death of the
child was not the means to any end in
this case.
It is difﬁcult to see how any Catholic
hospital or member of their staff could
have reached a conclusion different from
the one taken by St. Joseph’s Hospital
given: (a) the opinions of two highly
reputable conservative scholars in the
Catholic moral tradition; (b) the medical facts of the case; (c) the hospital’s
familiarity with justiﬁed cases of indirect
fetal termination in the literature; and
(d) their familiarity with the principle of
double effect.
It is my opinion that the intervention
performed at St. Joseph’s Hospital and
Medical Center on Nov. 5, 2009, cannot
properly be described as an abortion.
The moral object of the intervention was
548
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to save the life of the mother. The death
of the fetus was, at maximum, nondirect
and praeter intentionem.
More likely, the fetus was already
dying due to the pathological situation
prior to the intervention; as such, it is
inaccurate to understand the death of
the fetus as an accessory consequence to
the intervention.
I conclude that St. Joseph’s Hospital
and Medical Center acted in accord with
the Ethical and Religious Directives,
Catholic moral tradition and universally valid moral precepts in working to
respect the sanctity and dignity of life,
ﬁrst doing what they could to foster the
lives of both the mother and the child
and then, when it was clear the child had
begun the dying process, to do what they
could to save the mother.
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